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Abstract 
 
We use a contract theory/mechanism design framework to analyze the fiscal relations and reforms 
between the Central and Local governments in China, which are said to have made great 
contributions to economic growth since the “Economic Reform”. First, we present the mechanism (a 
fiscal incentive contract model), which has created incentives for the development agent (Local 
government), and clarify theoretically how the concept of “Bao (Contract)” works. We then 
comprehend the concept of “Bisai (Contest)” within the framework of the yardstick competition 
between Local governments, and review the mechanism which encourages proper information 
revelation through intergovernmental comparison and competition. Lastly, we make a theoretical 
comparative analysis on the fiscal system reform (from the Fiscal Contracting system to the Tax 
Sharing system), from the perspective of how much room was left for the “Ratchet Effect” in the 
dynamic relation between the Central and Local governments, and how it was solved (or mitigated) 
in the two fiscal systems. 
 
JEL: D82, D86, H11, H77 
 
Key Words: Fiscal Contracting, Tax Sharing, Adverse Selection, Mechanism Design, Yardstick 
Competition, Ratchet Effect 
 
Highlight 
 
・Fiscal incentive contract which has created incentives for the development agent (Local 
government) in China and the concept of “Bao (Contract)”.  
・Yardstick competition between Local governments and the concept of “Bisai (Contest)”. 
・“Ratchet Effect” in the dynamic relation between Central and Local governments and the 
comparison of the solutions in the two fiscal systems (Fiscal Contracting system and Tax Sharing 
system). 
・Enforcement through “Shading” as a Solution for the Ratchet and Renegotiation problems in the 
No Commitment environments. 
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1．Introduction 
 
Since the “Economic Reform” in 1978, the Chinese economy has achieved significant growth. 
Based on previous studies (e.g., Oi(1992), Qian and Weingast(1996,1997), Jin., Qian and 
Weingast(2005)) that reported that the fiscal reforms between the Central and Local governments 
implemented from the 1980s to the 1990s made great contributions to China’s economic growth, and 
taking a hint from the concepts of “Bao包(Contract)” and “Bisai 比賽 (Competition, Contest),” 
we analyze the structure of the fiscal relations between the Central and Local governments by using 
mechanism design and contract theory as analytical tools. 
First, we present the mechanism (a fiscal incentive contract model) that has created incentives 
for the development agent (Local government) and clarify theoretically how the concept of “Bao 
(Contract)” works. We then consider the concept of “Bisai (Competition, Contest)” within the 
framework of the yardstick competition between Local governments, and we review the mechanism 
that encourages proper information revelation through intergovernmental comparison and 
competition. Finally, we clarify theoretically how much room had (has) been left for the “Ratchet 
Effect” in the dynamic relation between the Central and Local governments by relating it to China’s 
governance reform during the “Reform Era” (after “Reform and Door-opening”), especially fiscal 
system reform (from the Fiscal Contracting system to the Tax Sharing system), from the perspective 
of how it has been addressed in China. 
  Let us start by presenting the following table to gain a broad perspective of China’s “Reform Era”, 
that is, the periods after “Reform and Opening up in 1978”. 
 
Leader Deng Xiaoping   Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao 
Period 1978－1992 1992－2002 2002－2012 
   Centralization vs. 
Decentralization 
Decentralization, 
Deregulation 
Centralization Reform 
Power of the Center 
Redistribution, but 
Rising Inequality 
Fiscal System Fiscal Contracting 
System 
Early-stage Contractual 
Tax sharing System 
Latter-stage  
Tax Sharing System 
Table1: China’s “Reform Era”= since “Reform and Door-Opening” 
 
 Two Key Concepts: Contract包 (“Bao”) and Contest比賽 (“Bisai”) 
 
We insist that the two concepts Contract包 (“Bao”) and Contest比賽 (“Bisai”) play a key role in 
understanding and explaining the essential structure of the fiscal relations between the Central and 
Local governments in China. 
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Contract包 (“Bao”) 
 The Fiscal Contracting System in table 1 was an arrangement under which a certain portion (a 
fixed amount or a fixed rate) of the national fiscal revenue collected by Local governments was paid 
to the Central government, the remainder being available for free spending by Local governments. 
This Fiscal Contract agreement implied that the more local economies grew, the more fiscal 
revenue they would receive, including money they could spend freely. Local governments, therefore, 
tried to make use of the authority they had obtained through decentralization and to work vigorously 
toward the region’s development and economic growth (see, e.g., Oi’s (1992) “Local State 
Corporatism” and Qian and Weingast’s (1996, 1997) “Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese 
Style”).1 
 
Competition, Contest比賽 (“Bisai”) 
The GDP growth rate of the jurisdictional region (e.g., province) was taken into account in 
reviewing personnel performance. This promotional competition system also incorporated the 
mechanism by which if they won, they were promoted, and if they lost, they were demoted. To be 
promoted or to remain in position, local executives had to keep producing higher performances, 
which means higher growth than other regions. 
Because industrialization and economic growth were directly connected to increased income or the 
promotion of local executives in this way, greater efforts would be required on their part to promote 
economic development.2 Thus, the local government-driven economic growth was (has been) 
realized (although high inflation also occurred, and regional gaps widened, as Miyake (2005) notes). 
 
 Based on such motivation, we first construct a fiscal incentive contract model between the 
Central (principal) and Local (agent) governments to explain how it has created incentives for the 
development agent (Local government), and we clarify theoretically how the concept of “Bao 
(Contract)” works. We then construct a framework of yardstick competition between the Local 
governments, review the mechanism that induces proper information revelation and incentives 
through comparison and competition, and uncover how the concept of “Bisai (Competition, 
Contest)” works. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) indicate that another ingredient is crucial, namely, political centralization. 
Its original idea comes from Riker (1964), who first developed the idea that for federalism to function and 
to be ensured, it must come with political centralization. Xu (2011) notes the importance of both political 
centralization and regional decentralization, which implies more than just fiscal decentralization. 
2 Based on a political science perspective, Miyake (2005) argues that the Central government could 
control the Local governments to a considerable degree through appropriately designing the promotion 
contest among regional leaders (local executives). 
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 Ratchet Effect 
 
 We further take note of the third concept, Ratchet Effect, in order to compare the two fiscal 
systems: Fiscal Contracting (1980~1993) and Tax Sharing (1994~). We use a dynamic contracting 
framework to present the comparative analysis, and we propose a new theoretical explanation. 
“Fiscal contracting” (1980~93) was a system whereby Local governments would collectively tax 
(and collect taxes for the Central government) and allocate the tax revenue in accordance with the 
allocation decision drawn up between the Central and Local governments. However, there was no 
clear rule under which the Central and Local governments committed themselves to the decision on 
tax allocation, and there was also a possibility that it might be changed by mutual negotiation ex post. 
Thus, both governments failed to commit to the predetermined allocation ratio over a long-term 
period and instead “renegotiated” it later.  
Hence, there were possibilities of a “Ratchet effect” and a “Renegotiation problem” posed by 
the dynamic contracting relation between the Central and Local governments, which generated a 
potential adverse effect inhibiting Local governments’ proper ex-ante information revelation. 
The “Tax sharing system” (1994~) fulfilled its commitment by carving up the share of the 
Central government clearly as a tax item, improving the predictability (“transparency”) of the system, 
and diminishing the possibility of the ratchet effect. “Transparency” in the tax sharing system would 
be institutionally evaluated as an “aspect of ex-ante commitment”. 
Although there remained the possibility of a “Ratchet Effect” in theory under the “Fiscal 
Contracting system”, it would be natural to consider that it had been solved (or mitigated) by some 
kind of mechanism because the average GDP growth rate had been astonishing (9-10%) throughout 
the 1980s and until 1993, as the table below indicates. 
 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
% 7.91 5.20 9.10 10.90 15.20 13.50 8.80 11.60 11.30 4.10 3.84 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
% 9.18 14.24 13.96 13.08 10.93 10.01 9.30 7.83 7.62 8.43 8.30 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% 9.08 10.03 10.09 11.31 12.68 14.16 9.64 9.21 10.45 9.24 (8.23) 
Table2:Real GDP Growth = Real Economic Growth Rate (1980～2012) 
Black %: Fiscal Contracting Era (1980-1993) and Red %: Tax Sharing Era (1994-Present) 
 
5 
 
Taking notice that China’s institutional structure is a combination of formality and informality, we 
present our two explanations based on the self-enforcement mechanism (a la Greif (1993) in Game 
Theory) and the shading mechanism (a la Hart-Moore (2008)) as its alternative. 
The first self-enforcing mechanism is as follows. In the dynamic fiscal relation between the 
Central government and more than one Local government, if the Central government suddenly 
changed the tax rate (or tax amount) and cheated the Local governments, the Local governments 
would then walk off “their job as a tax collecting institution” from the next year, and the Central 
government would suffer retaliation in the form of Local governments not conducting the taxation 
work properly. Moreover, there was a possibility that information that the “Central government had 
behaved as a ‘cheater’” might have spread to many other provinces, and various forms of objection 
and rejection might have occurred. Because it would entail a substantial cost on a long-term basis to 
renegotiate the fiscal contract ex-post and to cheat Local governments, the Central government 
voluntarily abstained from doing so. Being afraid of any future “retaliation” from more than one 
Local government, the Central government did not conduct any ex-post hold up (cheating by 
changing its taxation scheme), and it maintained cooperative behavior (tried not to deviate from the 
second-best commitment solution). This is a solution by a reputation mechanism for a “commitment 
problem” and is part of the “informal” governance mechanism within China’s intergovernmental 
fiscal relation between the Central and Local governments. 
As the second mechanism, we present the “Shading” mechanism a la Hart and Moore (2008). That 
is, after observing the hold-up or cheating by the Central government at the beginning of the second 
term, the local governments can “shade” (punish) the Central government by a constant times their 
“aggrievement” levels. When it is sufficiently large, the Central government, fearing being shaded, 
will not hold up (cheat) the Local governments, even though they have obtained this type of 
information from the first term outcome. This will, in turn, induce truthful information revelation in 
the first term. Thus, we show that the Ratchet and Renegotiation problems can be solved through the 
“Shading” Mechanism even under the No-Commitment environment in the “Fiscal contracting” 
regime (1980-1993). We believe our explanation of the enforcement mechanism through shading is 
new. 
We also discuss the complementarity with Tax system reform. In the Fiscal Contracting era 
(1980-1993), the local tax collection bureau was in charge of both Central and Local government 
revenues. Thus, responding to the cheating (deviation) behavior by the Central government, the local 
tax collection bureau could “shade (punish)” the Central government severely by walking off the job 
as a tax collecting institution of the Central government, which could strengthen the enforcement 
mechanism by shading. That is, the Tax System in the “Fiscal contracting” era reinforced the 
enforcement mechanism by shading. As far as we know, this viewpoint on institutional 
complementarity is also novel. 
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This paper is constructed as follows. In section 2, we present our basic hidden-information 
framework of Fiscal Incentive Contract between the Central (Principal) and Local (Agent) 
Governments, solve the second best problem by the Central Government, and then link the optimal 
solution to the concept of “Bao” 包 (Contract). In section 3, we analyze the framework of the 
yardstick competition between the Local governments, show the information disclosure function 
through comparison and competition, and link it to the Concept of “Bisai 比賽 (Contest)”. In 
section 4, we consider the dynamic contractual relation between the Central and Local Governments 
and analyze the possibility of the Ratchet Effect (dynamic time-inconsistency) and the Renegotiation 
Problem in the no-commitment environments. Then, we present its solution by a Self-enforcing 
mechanism and its alternative mechanism (“Shading”) and discuss the link with the Tax system 
reform (implemented in the change from Fiscal Contracting to Tax Sharing). In Section 5, we 
conclude the paper. 
 
2．Model Analysis 
 
2.1 Fiscal Incentive Contract between the Central (Principal) and Local (Agent) Governments 
 
Let the Central government be the Principal and the Local government be the Agent. The Local 
government has productivityθ ; θ  is either one of two types, high productivity θ or low 
productivityθ , i.e. { },θ θ θ∈ , and this is private information known only to the Local government. 
The ratio of each type is :1λ λ− , where ( )0,1λ∈ . 
  Let e  be the effort for regional development by the Local government (which is the “actual 
working unit of the development governance”), which includes support for the local economic 
environment and various approaches to regional development.3 
The output (GDP) Y of the region is,  
Y eθ= +                                    (1) 
The fiscal revenue of the Local government is calculated by deducting the Tax paid to the Central 
government (the Central government share or fiscal revenue) T as below.  
 Y T−                               (2) 
When letting the fiscal contract between the Central and Local governments be { },Y T (a 
combination of GDP Y and the Tax paid to the Central government T ), each type θ  has to 
                                                 
3 The role of Local government was important, such as acting to back up the activities of private 
companies. 
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choose its effort level e Y θ= − 　(fromY eθ= + ), and ( ) ( )C e C Y θ= −  represents the effort 
cost of the typeθ  agent when producing the output (GDP)Y . We assume the convexity of the effort 
cost function, i.e., ( ) ( )0, 0C Y C Yθ θ′ ′′− > − >  is fulfilled. 
Hence, the payoff function for Local government (typeθ  agent) is as below.4 

( )

( ) ( )

Fiscal Revenue of         Tax paid toEffort Cost Total Surplus when type Local Government Central Government
      generates GDP Y
Y T C e Y T C Y Y C Y T
θ
θ θ− − = − − − = − − −
(((
 (3)  
  
2.2 Perfect Information Solution (First Best Solution) 
 
Fiscal contracts for each Local government of the two types (high productivity, low productivity) 
are { },Y T and{ },Y T . Under a complete information regime where the Central government knows 
the Local government’s type { },θ θ θ∈ , the Central government imposes a fiscal scheme that 
maximizes central fiscal revenue while satisfying the participation constraint of each type
( ) 0Y T C Y θ− − − ≥ . Thus, the problem is: 
( )max        . . 0
T
T s t Y T C Y θ− − − ≥  
The participation constraint has equality at the optimal solution ( ( )T Y C Y θ= − − ). 
This results in total surplus maximization for each type: ( )max  
Y
Y C Y θ− −  
The first order condition for the optimality is ( )1 0C Y θ′− − = , and marginal benefit and marginal 
cost are equalized for each type. For each type ,θ θ , ( ) ( )1 C Y C Yθ θ′ ′= − = − is fulfilled. 
Therefore, the effort levels of each type are equal in the first best solution. FB FB FBe e e= =  
At this time, ,FB FB FB FBY e Y eθ θ= + = + , and the participation constraint is binding. 
Therefore, 
( ) ( )FB FB FB FB FBT Y C Y e C eθ θ= − − = + −  
                                                 
4 There are similarities with the formulation of Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation model. 
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( ) ( )FB FB FB FB FBT Y C Y e C eθ θ= − − = + −  
Through the difference in the Taxes paid to the Central government ( FB FBT T θ θ− = − ), the 
payoff of each type is equalized at 0. 
 
2.3 Asymmetric Information Environment, where there is asymmetric information concerning the 
typeθ  of the Local government (Agent) 
 
The fiscal scheme to be imposed on each type with the first best solution is as below. 
For typeθ , { ,FB FBY eθ= + ( )FB FB FBT e C eθ= + − }  
For typeθ , { FB FBY eθ= + , ( )FB FB FBT e C eθ= + − } 
 Under asymmetric information, it becomes a problem whether each agent has an incentive to 
reveal its type truthfully. 
First, we check the incentive for the high productive typeθ to reveal its type information: 
＊If he tells the truth, that is, when choosing his own menu, his payoff is 0 as is already shown. 
＊If he chooses the contract for typeθ  { FB FBY eθ= + , ( )FB FB FBT e C eθ= + − }, that is when 
telling a lie, his payoff is ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0FB FB FB FB FBY T C Y C e C eθ θ θ− − − = − − − >  
Because the high productivity typeθ  has an incentive to disguise himself as typeθ , both types 
result in choosing the menu { FBY , FBT } for the low productive typeθ .5 
 
We thus consider an incentive-compatible fiscal contract that gives the high productive typeθ an 
incentive to reveal its own information truthfully. 
 
 Incentive Constraint on the Local government of high productive typeθ  
 
The incentive constraint for the high productive typeθ not to choose the scheme for the low 
productive typeθ  is as follows.  
( ) ( )Y T C Y Y T C Yθ θ− − − ≥ − − −                          (6)  
                                                 
5 We can easily check that the low productivity type θ  does not have an incentive to choose the 
contract for typeθ , i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0FB FB FB FB FBY T C Y C e C eθ θ θ− − − = − + − <  
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 Participation Constraint 6 for the Local government of low productive typeθ  
 
The participation (individual rationality) constraint for the low productive typeθ  is as follows.  
( ) 0Y T C Y θ− − − ≥                                     (7) 
 
2.3.1 Second-Best Optimal Solution 
 
The optimization problem to be solved by the Central government (＝the design problem of an 
optimal self-selection mechanism) is: 
 
{ }
{ }

( )
,
, Central Fiscal Revenue from Local Central Fiscal Revenue from Local Government of high productivity Government of low productivity 
max    1
Y T
Y T
T T
θ θ
λ λ+ −
((
 
 
Subject to ( ) ( )Y T C Y Y T C Yθ θ− − − ≥ − − −                     (6) 
------Incentive constraint for Local governments of the high productive typeθ  
( ) 0Y T C Y θ− − − ≥                        (7) 
------Participation constraint for Local governments of the low productive typeθ  
 
At the optimal solution, the “participation constraint for the low productive typeθ ” is binding. 
  ( ) 0Y T C Y θ− − − =                                              (7’) 
Combining the “Incentive constraint for the high productive typeθ ” with the “(binding) 
participation constraint for the low productive typeθ ”, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y T C Y Y T C Y C Y C Yθ θ θ θ− − − ≥ − − − = − − −
 This is also binding at the optimal solution, so that 
( ) ( ) ( )                                                    (6 )Y T C Y C Y C Yθ θ θ ′− − − = − − −
    
 Therefore, Local governments of the high productive type θ  obtain the information rent 
                                                 
6We interpret the "participation constraint" for the local government such that the local government 
officials (including the executives) obtain the payoff 0 from outside opportunities by leaving the office. 
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( ) ( )C Y C Yθ θ− − −  at the optimum. This is a reward (a carrot) to encourage Local governments 
of the high productive type θ  to reveal the informationθ  truthfully, and at the same time is a cost 
for Central government (in the form of lower tax revenue).  
When ( )
Total Surplus generated by 
T Y C Y
θ
θ= − −
(((
 from (7’) and  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
Total Surplus generated by Information Rent
CY YT C Y C Y
θ
θθ θ= − − − − − −
((((
((((((((
 
from (6’) are substituted into the objective 
function of the optimization problem, and then organized, we have 

( )
Central Fiscal Revenue from Local Central Fiscal Revenue from Local Government of high productivity Government of low productivity 
1T T
θ θ
λ λ⋅ + − ⋅
((
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
InformatiTotal surplus by local government Total surplus by local government 
      of low productivity type      of high productivity type 
1 C Y C YY C Y Y C Y
θθ
λ θ θλ θ λ θ = − − + − − − −    − − −  
((((((
(((((
on rent given to 
high productivity type θ
((((((((
　　　
 
＊The first order condition for the optimal solution Y for the high productive type θ  is,  
( )1 0C Y θ′− − =      (8) 
and is consistent with the first best solution FBY . 
＊The optimal solutionY for the low productive type θ  reflects the balance between the first term 
and the second term below. 
  
{ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Information rent given to 
high productivity type 
Total surplus by local government 
  of low productivity type 
max  1
Y
Y C Y C Y C Y
θ θ
λ θ λ θ θ − − − − − − −    
((((((
((((((((
  
 
The first order condition for the optimality is 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Marginal total surplus with Marginal information rent
 Low productivity type 
1 1 0C Y C Y C Y
θ
λ θ λ θ θ ′ ′ ′− − − − − − − =    
((((((
((((((((
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1                 (9)1C Y C Y C Y
λθ θ θ
λ
 ′ ′ ′⇔ − − = − − − −  
which means that the optimal solutionY should be chosen in a manner such that the increase in total 
surplus that a marginal growth of GDP Y  of the low productive typeθ  produces and the 
corresponding growth of the information rent (an increase in the cost incurred for having the 
informationθ  revealed truthfully) are well-balanced. 
From the above first order conditions, it is optimal to set the first best solution (“Efficiency at 
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Top”) FBe e=  for the high productive type (8), and a “Low-powered” incentive which gives 
“Downward Distortion at Bottom” FBe e< for the low productive type (9). In summary, we have: 
 
Proposition 17 
The second-best fiscal contract under asymmetric information has the properties of 
(1)Efficiency at the top (for the high productive type) * *FB FBY Y e e= ⇔ =  
(2)Downward distortion at the bottom (for the low productive type) * *FB FBY Y e e< ⇔ <  
 
 The result of * FBY Y< for the low productive type θ can be understood by looking at the below 
figure, which shows that the optimal solution *Y  is determined such that the marginal benefit 1 
equals the marginal virtual cost (the marginal cost 
( )C Y
Y
θ∂ −
∂  
plus the marginal information rent  
( ) ( )C YC Y
Y Y
θθ ∂ −∂ −
−
∂ ∂
for the high productive type θ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Optimal Solution *Y for Low Productivity Type θ  
 
The Concept of “Bao 包 (Contract)”  
 
The concept of “Bao” 包 (Contract) can be understood better by exploring the optimal fiscal 
incentive contract between the Central and Local governments. 
                                                 
7 This is a familiar result in the literature (e.g. Baron and Myerson (1982), Maskin and Riley (1984), and 
Bolton and Whinston (2005)). 
MB 
Virtual MC 
*Y  Y  0  
1  ( )
Marginal Cost
C Y
Y
θ∂ −
∂
 
 
( ) ( )
1
      Marginal Information Rent
C YC Y
Y Y
θθλ
λ
 ∂ −∂ −
− 
− ∂ ∂  
 
 
 
FBY  
Virtual Marginal Cost 
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First, by differentiating both sides of ( ) ( ) ( ){ }T Y C Y C Y C Yθ θ θ= − − − − − − byY , and 
combining the first order condition (8), we have ( ) ( )1 0FB FBT Y C Y θ′ ′= − − = , which means 
that regarding Local governments of the high productive type (abundant regions), the marginal Tax 
paid to the Central government according to the marginal growth of GDP is zero at the optimum. It 
follows that ( )1 1FBT Y′− = , which means that 100% of the marginal rate of the remainder of the 
local fiscal revenue belongs to the Local government of the high productive type (abundant 
regions).8 That is, the high productive typeθ can receive 100% of the marginal benefit from GDP 
growth. This, in essence, is the same as the “100% piece-rate system”.9 
Next, by differentiating both sides of ( )T Y C Y θ= − −  by Y  and combining the first order 
condition (9), we have ( ) ( )1T Y C Y θ′ ′= − − = ( ) ( ) ( )1 C Y C Y
λ θ θ
λ
 ′ ′− − − −
  
( ) 0T Y′ >  means that regarding the low productive typeθ , the marginal Tax paid to the Central 
government according to the marginal growth of GDP is positive. That is, Local governments cannot 
receive 100% of the marginal benefit of GDP growth, i.e., ( )1 1T Y′− < and ( )T Y′ flows to the 
Central government. Therefore, the marginal incentive also decreases * FBY Y≤  at the optimum. 
In summary, we have 
Proposition2 The degree of “Bao” 包 (Contract) ( )b θ  can be understood as the marginal rate 
of the local fiscal revenue. It increases in the productivity type θat the optimum, as follows. 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
*
1 1 for
1
1 1 for
FBT Y
b T Y
T Y
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ*
 ′− = =′= − = 
′− < =
 
 
The theoretical intuition behind this proposition is as follows. To maximize the expected total 
surplus (efficiency), the Central government should set the GDP for the low productivity region θ  
                                                 
8 The concept of “Bao” 包 works similarly in the “Household contract responsibility” system, which 
began in rural areas in 1978. The system introduced market incentives to agricultural production and 
resulted in a dramatic increase in agricultural productivity. See, McMillan, J. (1992) and McMillan, J. et 
al. (1989). 
9 Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2005) found a high marginal piece-rate value of 0.8~0.9 in 1989-1993 (later 
“Fiscal contracting” period). 
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at the first best level FBY Y* = . However, the Central government must then give up the larger 
information rent for the high productive typeθ . As an optimal solution to the trade-off between the 
GDP for the low productivity region θ  and the information rent for the high productive regionθ , 
the Central government induces the lower GDP FBY Y* <  for the low productivity region θ , 
which is a second-order loss, but attains the Tax increase through reducing the information rent for 
the high productive regionθ , which is a first-order gain. To induce the lower GDP FBY Y* < , the 
Central government adopts a less-than 100% “Bao” (Contract) ( ) 1b θ < , that is, a lower-powered 
incentive scheme for the low productivity local governmentθ .10 
 
2.3.2 Graphical Explanation 
 
The objective function of the Local government (agent of typeθ ) is 
             
( ) ( ), :U Y T Y T C Yθ θ= − − −
 
and this draws an indifference curve of typeθ  on the ( ),Y T plane. 
We obtain a marginal rate of substitution for typeθ  ( )
const.
1YT
U
dTMRS C Y
dY
θ θ
=
′= = − − . 
The first order condition for the optimality which characterizes the first best solution is 
( )1 0C Y θ′− − = , from which we define FBY eθ− = . This then proves that at the first best 
solution, the effort levels of each type are equal FB FB FBe e e= = , and since FB FBY Y θ θ− = − , 
the difference in GDP level is only the difference in the productive type. In this case, as 
( )
0  
1 0    
0  
FB
FB
YT
FB
if Y e
MRS C Y if Y e
if Y e
θ
θ
θ θ
θ
> < +
′= − − = = +
< > +
 
shows, the indifference curve of each type θ  reaches its peak at the first best GDP level
                                                 
10 This argument is based on the (standard) assumption that the Central government maximizes only its 
own expected payoff and does not put any weight on the Local governments’ payoffs. In the appendix, we 
examine the optimal solution when the Central Government is altruistic and puts a positive weight on the 
high productivity type’s payoff. 
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FB FBY eθ= + and becomes an upward-convex symmetric parabola (see diagram below). The first 
best solutions are L and H in the diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Figure 2: Indifference Curves and First Best Solutions for both typesθ andθ  
 
Under perfect information, the Central government is able to identify type information, such that it 
can assign and enforce the point L  in the diagram to type θ  and the point H to typeθ . 
 However, under asymmetric information as in the diagram below, the gain will be higher by 
( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − −  if the high productive type θ  chooses point L instead of point H , 
and this produces an incentive to disguise its information as being the low productive typeθ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Incentive for high productive typeθ to choose point L  
L  FBT  
FBT  
H  
0  FBY  FBY  
T  
GDP
Y
 
( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − −  
GDP
Y
 
T  
FBY  FBY  0  
H  
FBT  
FBT  
L  
Indifference curve for typeθ  
Indifference curve for typeθ  
Indifference curve for typeθ  
Indifference curve for typeθ  
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This will result in lowering the tax revenue of the Central government ( FB FBT T θ θ− = − ). 
Therefore, the Central government gives up the first best solution, offers the two contract menus
{ },L H′ ′ as shown below, elicits true information by inducing typeθ  to choose L′ , and typeθ to 
choose H ′ , and achieves a payoff increase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        
 Figure 4: Second Best Solutions H ′  and L′  
 
At point H ′ , because ( ) 0FBT Y′ = , the rate to be paid to the Central government according to the 
marginal growth of the regional GDP is zero, and with ( )1 1FBT Y′− = being virtually the same as 
a “100% piece-rate system,” 100% of the marginal GDP growth belongs to the Local government. 
Therefore, an incentive for the first best solution is derived (“Efficiency at Top”).  
Conversely, because ( )* 0T Y′ > , Local governments cannot receive 100% of the marginal 
result of GDP growth at point L′ , and the portion ( )*T Y′  flows to the Central government. Thus, 
the derived marginal incentive also decreases (“Downward Distortion at Bottom”). 
 
 
 
GDP
Y
 
T  
FBY  FBY  0  
H  
FBT  
FBT  
L  
( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − −  H ′  
L′  Indifference curve for typeθ   
Indifference curve for typeθ  
 
*Y  
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3．Competition between Local Governments: the Yardstick Mechanism in 
Correlated Environments 
 
The Concept of “Bisai 比賽 (Contest)” 
 
It is also said that “Bao 包 (Contract)” and “Bisai 比賽  (Competition)” function in 
combination within the relation between the Central and Local governments as an institutional 
basis of the Chinese economy after “reform and opening-up.” Now, 比賽 (Competition) will be 
analyzed within the framework of the yardstick competition between the Local governments to show 
the information disclosure function through comparison and competition. 
In the case where productivity information is “perfectly correlated”11 between two regions, 
truth-telling (honest revelation of productivity) can be achieved as a dominant strategy equilibrium 
by generating a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game of information revelation. In equilibrium, there is no 
need to give informational rent to the Local government, and the first best solution can be achieved. 
Even when the situation is not in perfect correlation but is close to it, informational rent could be 
decreased and efficiency increased, compared with the case without comparison and competition. 
The private information ( ),i jθ θ of Local governments ,i j  are perfectly correlated, i.e. 
( ) ( )
( )
, with prob.
,    
with prob. 1,
i j
θ θ λ
θ θ
λθ θ
=  −
 
( ) ( ),i i i j i iY T Y Y C Y θ− − −  is the payoff function of Local government i  in the case where the 
Local government i  (type iθ ) achieves iY (GDP), and Local government j  (type jθ ) achieves 
jY (GDP). ( ),i jT Y Y is the tax amount paid to the Central government (Taxation). Hence, we can 
regard ( ),i jT Y Y as a “Fiscal contract” proposed by the Central government. 12 
                                                 
11 We can generalize it to a more general setting, including imperfect correlation. Although a possible 
framework would be an optimal auction model, it seems to be rather difficult for the Central government 
(the State) to design the elaborate optimal auction-type mechanism ex ante and commit to it. In other 
words, some contract incompleteness would accompany the concept of “Bisai” (Contest) and its 
mechanism. 
12 We describe the relationship between the central and local governments by the contract theory 
framework that assumes players are independent entities, according to the “Local State Corporatism” of 
Oi (1992), rather than by a hierarchical relationship in an organization. 
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The point of this scheme is the side transfer (payoff transfer) from the Local government with a 
low GDP FBY (θ  reported) to the Local government with a high GDP FBY (θ  reported). This 
scheme incorporates the payoff change, the term Δ, due to the promotion/demotion of the local 
executives (officials) based on the relative outcome of the regional growth (GDP) competition. As a 
whole, therefore, we can interpret the model of this section as a contest model to incorporate the 
incentive effect of yardstick competitions.13  
First, we explore the incentive of the local government of type iθ θ=  in the state ( ),θ θ  under 
the above scheme. His payoff function is written as ( ) ( ),i i i j iY T Y Y C Y θ− − − , which is the payoff 
when the Local government of type iθ θ=  chooses the output (GDP) iY  given that the other 
Local government chooses the output (GDP) jY .  
*Suppose that the other Local government jθ θ=  chooses the low output
FBY .  
Then, if the Local government iθ θ= chooses the low output
FBY , he will obtain the payoff  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ),FB FB FB FB FB FBiY T Y Y C Y C e C eθ θ θ− − − = − − − . 
If the Local government iθ θ= chooses the high output
FBY , he will obtain the payoff  
                                                 
13 Li and Zhou (2005) empirically show that in China, the government official promotion process 
resembles a tournament, and the final decision is mainly based on relative performance in economic 
growth. The contest model of this section would be suitable for such situations. 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } ( )
,FB FB FB FBi
FB FB FB FB FB FB
Y T Y Y C Y
e e C e C e C e C e
θ
θ θ θ θ
− − −
 = + − + − − − − − + ∆−
( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ= − − − + ∆ . 
Hence, the Local government iθ θ= has an incentive to choose the high output (GDP)
FBY . 
*Next, suppose that the other Local government jθ θ= chooses the high output (GDP)
FBY . 
Then, if the Local government iθ θ= chooses the low output (GDP)
FBY , he will obtain the payoff 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( )
,FB FB FB FBi
FB FB FB FB FB FB
Y T Y Y C Y
e e C e C e C e C e
θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
− − −
 = + − + − + − − − + ∆ − − − 
= −∆
 
If the Local government iθ θ= chooses the high output (GDP)
FBY , he will obtain the payoff 
( ) ( ), 0FB FB FB FBiY T Y Y C Y θ− − − = . 
Hence, the Local government iθ θ= has an incentive to choose the high output
FBY . That is, 
regardless of the other player jθ θ= ’s choices, the Local government iθ θ= has a strict incentive 
to choose the high output FBY . 
The incentive structure of the Local government jθ θ=  is also the same. Regardless of the 
other player iθ θ= ’s choices, the Local government jθ θ= has a strict incentive to choose the 
high output FBY . The choice of FBY  is the dominant strategy for the agent jθ θ= . 
The payoff matrix is as follows. 
Note that perfect correlation of the private information ( ) ( ), ,i jθ θ θ θ=  can be relaxed. 
Essentially, as the payoff matrix shows, the Central government places the two Local governments in 
a prisoner’s dilemma game. By exploiting this structure, the Central government can implement the 
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full information first best optimum in the unique dominant strategy equilibrium.14 
 
       jθ θ=   
iθ θ=                         
FBY                            FBY   
                     ( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − −        ( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − − + ∆  
   FBY        ( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − −            −∆  
 
                                           −∆                          0 
  FBY        ( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − − + ∆           0 
          
 Table 3: Incentive Structure for High Productivity Types ( ),θ θ  
Next, we explore the incentive of the agent of type iθ θ=  in the state ( ),θ θ . His payoff function 
is written as ( ) ( ),i i i j iY T Y Y C Y θ− − −  when the Local government iθ θ=  chooses the output 
(GDP) iY  given that the other Local government chooses the output (GDP) jY . 
*Suppose that the other Local government jθ θ= chooses the low output
FBY . 
Then, if the Local government iθ θ=  chooses the low output
FBY , he will obtain the payoff 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 0FB FB FB FB FB FB FB FBiY T Y Y C Y e e C e C eθ θ θ − − − = + − + − − =  . 
If the Local government iθ θ=  chooses the high output
FBY , he will obtain the payoff 
                                                 
14 A key problem in the design of optimal contracts in correlated environments is the possibility of 
multiple equilibria in the subgame played by the parties whose private information is correlated. As noted 
by Demski and Sappington (1984), multiple equilibria do not pose a problem when the private 
information is perfectly correlated. Shleifer (1985) presents a theory of Yardstick Competition in the 
perfect correlation environment in the regulation context. 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
,FB FB FB FBi
FB FB FB FB FB FB
FB FB FB FB
Y T Y Y C Y
e e C e C e C e C e
C e C e C e C e
θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
− − −
 = + − + − − − − − + ∆ − + − 
 = + − − − + ∆ − + − 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 2
FB FB
FB
C e C e
C e
θ θ θ θ
−
 − − + + −
 = −
 
 
+ ∆
((((((((((((((((((
 
The negative sign is due to the convexity of the cost function 0, 0C C′ ′′> > . 
Hence, the Local government iθ θ=  has an incentive to choose the low output (GDP) 
FBY  if ∆
is sufficiently small. 
*Next, suppose that the other Local government jθ θ= chooses the high output (GDP)
FBY .Then, 
if the Local government iθ θ=  chooses the low output (GDP)
FBY , he will obtain the payoff 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } ( )
,FB FB FB FBi
FB FB FB FB FB FB
Y T Y Y C Y
e e C e C e C e C e
θ
θ θ θ θ
− − −
 = + − + − + − − − + ∆ − 
( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ = − − − − + ∆   
If the agent iθ θ=  chooses the high output
FBY , he will obtain the payoff 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
,
0
FB FB FB FB
i
FB FB FB FB FB FB FB
Y T Y Y C Y
e e e C e C e C e C e
θ
θ θ θ θ θ
− − −
 = + − + − − + − = − + − < 
. 
Taking the difference of the payoffs, we have 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 2
FB FB FB FB
FB FB
FB
C e C e C e C e
C e C e
C e
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
−
 − + − + − − − + ∆ 
 − − + + −
 = −
 
 
+ ∆
((((((((((((((((((
 
Thus, the Local government iθ θ=  has a strict incentive to choose the low output
FBY , or it has no 
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incentive to deviate from FBY  to FBY , if ( )Δ 0> is sufficiently small. 
 Thus, regardless of the other Local government jθ θ= ’s choices, the Local government iθ θ=  
has an incentive to choose the low output FBY , if ( )Δ 0> is sufficiently small. The choice of FBY is 
the dominant strategy for the low productivity Local government iθ θ= . 
  The incentive structure of the agent jθ θ=  is the same. Regardless of the other player iθ θ= ’s 
choices, the Local government jθ θ=  has a strict incentive to choose the low output
FBY , if 
( )Δ 0> is sufficiently small. The choice of FBY is the dominant strategy for the low productivity 
Local government iθ θ= . The payoff matrix is as below. 
 
jθ θ=  
                                                        
iθ θ=  
 
               
                                        
 
 
 
 
                                
 
        
 
 
 
Table 4: Incentive Structure for Low Productivity Types ( ),θ θ  
  Perfect correlation of the private information ( ) ( ), ,i jθ θ θ θ=  can also be relaxed here. As the 
FBY  
      0
0  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 0 2 (2 ?)
FB FB
FB
C e C e
C e
θ θ θ θ
−
+
 − − +
+∆
+ −
 −
 
 
<
((((((((((((((((((

( ) ( )( ) 0FB FBC e C e θ θ − − − − + ∆ <   
 
FBY  
FBY  
FBY  
( ) ( )( ) 0FB FBC e C e θ θ − − − − + ∆ <   
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 0 2 (2 ?)
FB FB
FB
C e C e
C e
θ θ θ θ
−
+
 − − +
+∆
+ −
 −
 
 
<
((((((((((((((((((

 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
      0
0
FB FB
FB FB
C e C e
C e C e
θ θ
θ θ
− + − <
− + − <
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payoff matrix shows, the Central government places the two Local governments in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game, thereby implementing the full information first best optimum in the unique dominant 
strategy equilibrium at no incentive cost. 
Summarizing the arguments so far, we have: 
 
Proposition3: 
Under perfect correlation of the private information of the two agents, the Central government can 
implement the full information first best optimum in the unique dominant strategy equilibrium15, 
without giving any information rent. Equilibrium contracts are Pareto efficient in both states ( ),θ θ
and ( ),θ θ , if ( )Δ 0> is sufficiently small. 
 
Numerical Example 
Taking into consideration the convexity of the cost function, we set 
( ) ( ) 4,FB FBC e C e θ− −∆ = ( ) ( ) 8,FB FBC e C eθ+ ∆ − = 1∆ = . 
We then have the following numerical examples, where the structure of the ( ),θ θ game is a 
prisoner’s dilemma and truth-telling is the dominant strategy. 
 
High Productivity Type ( ),θ θ                 Low Productivity Type ( ),θ θ  
Each Strategy  θ（Lie） θ （Truth）   Each Strategy  θ （Lie） θ（Truth） 
 
θ（Lie）    ４,４    －１,５           θ （Lie）    －８,－８  －３,－５ 
 
 θ （Truth）  ５,－１   ０,０            θ（Truth）   －５,－３    ０,０ 
 
Note that the term ∆  in the above fiscal contract can be interpreted as a potential gain from 
promotion opportunities, or the strength of the promotion opportunities. Our model corresponds 
to the situation where the potential gain from promotion through winning the contest (“Bisai”比賽) 
of regional growth
 
( ) ( )( )  FB FBC e C e θ θ− − − + ∆ exceeds the information rent from disguising 
                                                 
15 Of course, in this dominant strategy equilibrium, the Nash incentive compatibility constraints are also 
satisfied, in the sense that it is optimal for agent i to behave truthfully given that agent j  behaves 
truthfully, and vice versa. 
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the region’s true information ( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − −  by ∆ . This could be said to be a 
“Chinese-style” situation.16 
However, in the case where ∆  is sufficiently large (e.g. 5∆ = ) to make up for the net cost of 
producing a high GDP outputs (reporting false information), it becomes the dominant strategy 
equilibrium for both players of ( ) ( ), ,i jθ θ θ θ=  to produce a combination of high GDP outputs
( ),FB FBY Y . 
                            θ （Lie）          θ（Truth） 
 
θ （Lie）   －８ －８      １  －９ 
 
θ（Truth）  －９ １      ０  ０ 
 
In this case, the pooling equilibrium emerges, where both (high and low) types produce high GDP 
outputs, which will bring about high inflation in theory. Indeed, double-digit inflation continued for 
three years until 1995 when the Law of the People’s Bank of China (Central bank of China) was 
enforced. Until 1995, the local government could collude with the local branch of the Central bank 
and soften its budget constraint17 through its financing. Hence, when the promotional benefit was 
larger than making up for the (net) extra effort cost required to attain the high GDP output
FBY , i.e.,
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )FB FB FB FBC e C e C e C eθ θ θ θ   + − − − − − − ∆ >  , the low productive type 
θ  of the local government had an incentive to collude with the local branch of the Central bank and 
secure the promotion (win the contest).18 After 1995, such loopholes through collusion and soft 
budgeting were prohibited by law, and as a result, high inflation was suddenly suppressed in 1996 
and 1997. 
                                                 
16 As Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue, in China, the Communist party has the power to appoint and 
dismiss local executives, and has exercised this power both to reward those whose regions have 
performed well economically, and to punish those who have followed anti-growth policies. The term∆
could be interpreted to imply a prize as the difference between promotion reward and demotion penalty. 
Our model has a property of both fiscal federalism which has played a helpful role in promoting China’s 
economic growth and high centralization in personnel controls, i.e. political centralization. 
17 For the Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) problem, see, e.g. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). 
18 Suzuki (2007) considered the three-tier agency hierarchy, where the low productive agent θ  can 
collude with the supervisor and secure a good job (win the contest). Because the candidate agents have 
exactly the same incentive structure, this can lead to fierce competition for coalition formation with the 
common supervisor. The logic is close to an incentive for the low-productive Local government to attain 
high GDP output through collusive soft budgeting and try to win the promotion contest (“Bisai”). 
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4．Dynamic Contractual Relation: Ratchet Effect and Renegotiation Problem 
 
4.1 Commitment Case 
Assuming that the relation between the Central and Local governments is 1:1, the setting is back 
to where the type information of the Local government { },θ θ θ∈ is private and unknown to the 
Central government. We now assume that this relation is repeated for two fiscal terms.19 
In the case where the Central government can make an ex-ante commitment to the fiscal contract, 
it is most appropriate to repeat the second best optimal solution of the first term’s model { },L H′ ′  
for every term. The Central government elicits true information by inducing typeθ  to choose L′  
and typeθ  to choose H ′ , and it obtains fiscal revenues 
*T  and *T  in every term with the 
optimal solution of the one term model L′ H ′ . 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   Figure 5: Second Best Commitment Solutions H ′  and L′  
 
4.2 No-Commitment Case 
However, in the case where the Central government cannot make a commitment to the fiscal 
contract, there exists an incentive for the Central government to change the commitment solution 
ex-post by using the information the Local government disclosed during the first term.20 
                                                 
19 We assume that the productivity of the local government is constant over time. 
20 The early literature that studied this problem includes the following: Dewatripont (1989), Hart and 
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When the low productivity type θ
 
reveals information by choosing contract L′  for the 
first term, there exists an incentive for the Central government to increase the payoff (central 
tax revenue) for the second term by removing the “Downward Distortion at Bottom,” which has 
been made against the low productivity type. Therefore, it offers an efficient contract L  instead 
of contract L′ in the above.21 As long as the low productivity type has veto power and the Central 
government has to obtain an agreement on the change in policy, L′  and L  become indifferent. 
Conversely, the payoff for the Central government increases precisely by *FBT T− , and the new 
point L  has achieved a Pareto improvement over the original point L′ . This can be said to be a 
“Renegotiation Problem” in the dynamic contractual relation. 
Meanwhile, the Central government can absorb all of the information rent by offering a contract 
H  to the high productivity type for the second term because it has revealed information that its 
type isθ . Because it is already known that this region has high productivity and high potential, the 
Central government has an incentive to increase the central tax from *T to FBT and make a larger 
gain. This is called the “Ratchet Problem”. If the high productivity type θ foresees this change in 
advance, the incentive constraint of the ex-ante information disclosure cannot be satisfied. The Local 
government θ will disguise itself as a low productivity type θ by choosing contract L′  for the 
first term and will attempt to secure the information rent in the future. 
If the high productivity type θ foresees the above-mentioned ex-post modification, it will 
disguise itself as a low productivity type by choosing L′  instead of its proper contract H ′  for 
the first term, and then choose L  for the second term so that it can maximize its dynamic 
payoff. In fact, this is beneficial for the high productivity type because it does not change the payoff 
for the first term ( ( ) ( )( )* *C e C e θ θ− − − ), and it still obtains the information rent for the 
second term ( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − − . 
 In short, the H type foresees the Central government’s ex-post policy modification 
(“Hold-up”) and chooses L′  for the first term and L  for the second term, while the L type 
similarly chooses L′  for the first term and L  for the second term. Thus a so-called pooling 
equilibrium may be realized. 22 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Tirole (1988), and Laffont and Tirole (1988). This subsection 4.2 is essentially based on their results. 
21 Note that the indifference curve of the Central government (horizontal line) and the indifference curve 
of the low productive type cross (are inefficient) at point L′ , while they are tangential (efficient) at point
L . 
22 This could be viewed as the ex post Soft-Budgeting incentive by the Central government in the form of 
increasing Central Tax revenues *T  at FBT , and *T at FBT . As the literature (e.g., Dewatripont and 
Maskin (1995)) indicates, this brings about ex-ante inefficient behavior, in this case, in the form of 
inhibiting the proper information revelation by the Local government. 
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4.3 Comparison between the “Fiscal contracting system（財政請負制）(from 1980 to 1993)” 
and the “Tax sharing system（分税制）(from 1994 onward)” 
Qian et al. concluded that the “Fiscal contracting system” had ensured incentives for Local 
governments and played a considerable role in economic development and structural reform. The 
“Fiscal contracting system” strengthened the fiscal incentive of Local governments, and this in turn 
promoted the growth of non-state owned enterprises (private companies) and drove the structural 
reform of state owned enterprises (SOEs). Qian evaluated this system as the driving force that 
effected the astounding annual average rate of GDP growth of 10% throughout the 1980s. 
  However, there was an “uncertainty” in condition setting in that the rate and amount paid to the 
Central government for each year was decided by negotiation between the Central and Local 
governments. Therefore, “Fiscal contracting（財政請負制）” was a system where room for 
discretionary negotiations between the Central and Local governments continued to be 
important, and there were also possibilities of a “ratchet effect” and a “renegotiation problem” 
posed by the dynamic contracting relation. There was a potential adverse effect inhibiting Local 
governments’ proper ex-ante information revelation. 23 
Conversely, the “Tax sharing system（分税制）” achieved its commitment by carving up the 
share of the Central government clearly as a tax item, improving the predictability 
(“transparency”) of the system, and diminishing the possibility of the ratchet effect, which 
allowed the increase in revenue to be confiscated ex-post by the Central government. 
“Transparency” in the tax sharing system was institutionally evaluated as an “aspect of ex-ante 
commitment”. 
 
4.4 Ratchet effect (dynamic time-inconsistency) and its solution by a Self-enforcing mechanism 
 
Although there remained the possibility of a “Ratchet Effect” in theory under the “Fiscal 
Contracting system”, it would be natural to consider that it had been solved (or mitigated) by 
some kind of mechanism because the GDP growth rate had been astonishing throughout the 1980s. 
Taking note that China’s institutional structure is a combination of formality and informality, we 
consider the following. 
China’s taxation system was called “classified management（分級管理）,” where tax was 
collected by Local governments and used by the Central government. In this structure, the tax 
collecting operation was dependent on Local governments. Here, in the dynamic fiscal relation 
between the Central government and more than one Local government, if the Central government 
                                                 
23 This can be viewed as one of the bad aspects of “flexibility” or “flexible systems”, which will lead to 
some dissipation of surplus. Hart and Moore (2008) highlighted this idea as a basic motivation in their 
(behavioral) incomplete contracting model. 
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suddenly changed the tax rate (or amount) to be paid and cheated the Local governments, the 
Local governments would then walk off “their job as a tax collecting institution” from the next 
year, and the Central government would suffer retaliation in the form of Local governments 
not conducting the taxation work properly. Moreover, there was a possibility that the 
information that the “Central government had behaved as a ‘cheater’” might have spread to 
many other provinces, and various forms of objection and rejection might have occurred. Because 
it would entail a substantial cost on a long-term basis to renegotiate the fiscal contract ex-post and to 
cheat Local governments, the Central government voluntarily abstained from doing so. 
Being afraid of any future “retaliation” from more than one Local government, the Central 
government did not conduct any ex-post hold up (cheating by changing its taxation scheme), and it 
maintained cooperative behavior (tried not to deviate from the second best commitment solution).24 
This is a solution implemented by the Central government in an effort to build trust, that is, a 
solution by a reputation mechanism for a “commitment problem,” and this is part of the 
“informal” governance mechanism within China’s intergovernmental fiscal relation between the 
Central and Local governments. 
 
4.5 A New Theoretical Explanation: the “Shading” Mechanism a la Hart and Moore (2008) 
 
Although a solution through reputation for a “commitment problem” is a so-called trigger 
mechanism in Game Theory (see, e.g., McMillan (1992)), it works within an infinite-horizon 
repeated game framework. Because our model is a two-term (two-period) model, we may have to 
present a more explicit punishment mechanism in our two-term framework. Thus, we present the 
“Shading” mechanism a la Hart and Moore (2008). That is, after observing the hold-up or cheating 
by the Central government at the beginning of the second term, the local governments can “shade” 
(punish) the Central government by a constant times their “aggrievement” levels. When it is 
sufficiently large, the Central government, fearing being shaded, will not hold up (cheat) the Local 
governments, even though it has obtained the type information from the first-term outcome. This 
will in turn induce truthful information revelation in the first term. 
The incentive for an opportunistic renegotiation offer by the principal after the information 
revelation
 θ in the first term is ( ) ( )( )* *C e C e θ θ− − − , which means the principal does not pay 
the information rent to typeθ . Conversely, the entitlement for the agent of typeθ  is just
( ) ( )( )* *C e C e θ θ− − −  because it is the fair reward promised ex ante to the agent of typeθ for 
                                                 
24 The essential idea could be said to be the same as the self-enforcement mechanism through the 
multi-lateral punishment a la Grief (1993). Levin (2002) proposes a similar self-enforcement mechanism 
in the principal-multi agent employment relationships. 
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revealing its information truthfully. Hence, faced with the opportunistic renegotiation offer by the 
principal, the agent feels aggrievement ( ) ( )( )* *C e C e θ θ− − −  and shades (punishes) the 
principal by a constant γ times its aggrievement ( ) ( )( )* *C e C eγ θ θ − − −  , where 1γ ≤ . 
However, the shading by only one agent may not be enough to suppress the opportunistic 
renegotiation by the principal because 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* * * *
Deviation Incentive by Central Government Shading by One Local Government
, for 0 1C e C e C e C eθ θ γ θ θ γ − − − ≥ − − − ≤ ≤ 
((((((((
((((((((((
25 
Nonetheless, as we argued in Section 4.5, there was a possibility that the information that “the 
Central government has behaved opportunistically or held up” would spread to many other (say,
2N ≥ ) provinces and that various forms of objection and rejection might occur. 
That is, if the shadings by N multiple agents ( N multiple Local Governments) occurred at the 
same time, it would be possible to suppress the deviation behavior by the principal (Central 
Government), as the following incentive constraint shows. 26 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* * * *
Deviation Incentive by Central Government Shading by N Local Governments
1NC e C e C e C Neθ θ γ θ θ γ − − − ≤ − − − ⇔ ≥ 
((((((((
((((((((((
 
This is essentially the same logic as the incentive constraint (self-enforcing constraint) for the 
principal in the trigger strategy equilibrium in the infinite horizon repeated games, in that even 
though the principal has an incentive to deviate, she does not deviate in a self-enforcing way, 
expecting her payoff loss by the severe shading (punishment) behaviors of N agents. 27 
 
Proposition 4.1 
The Ratchet Problem in the No-Commitment environment under the “Fiscal contracting” regime 
can be solved through the “Shading” Mechanism if either the shading parameterγ  is greater than 1, 
i.e., 1γ > , or even if the shading parameterγ  is less than 1, i.e., 1γ ≤ , the shadings by N
multiple Local Governments occur, and 1Nγ ≥  holds. 
 
Next, let us discuss the incentive for Pareto-improving renegotiation at point L′ in the second term. 
                                                 
25 If the degree of shading strengthγ can be greater than 1, i.e., 1γ > , the right-hand side of the 
inequality can be greater than the left-hand side. That is, the shading by only one agent is sufficient to 
deter the opportunistic renegotiation by the principal. 
26 Note that this condition may not always hold because it depends onγ  (the degree of shading strength) 
and N (the number of shading agents). However, it would be consistent with the changeover to the formal, 
complete contractual Tax Sharing system. 
27 Fehr et al (2014), in their experimental paper on the buyer-supplier relationship, conjecture that the 
buyer will not renegotiate opportunistically as often in equilibrium if he expects a large increase in 
shading on the side of the seller or the shading reaction by the seller, and they indeed obtain a supportive 
experimental result. This result would provide a behavioral foundation to our logic here. 
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At point L′ , the Central government will have an incentive to make the Pareto-improving offer to 
the low productivity typeθ  in order to restore the second-order loss *FBT T− =  
( )( ) ( )( )* *FB FBe C e e C e− − − . That is, the Central government will offer the first best contract
L instead of the second best one L′ . However, the high productivity typeθ would in turn think that 
he should now be entitled to obtain the information rent ( ) ( )( )FB FBC e C e θ θ− − − . Nonetheless, 
the contract H ′  only assures the information rent ( ) ( )( )* *C e C e θ θ− − − for him. Hence, the 
high productivity typeθ  would feel that the remaining information rent  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* *FB FBC e C e C e C eθ θ θ θ   − − − − − − −     was aggrieved. He shades 
(punishes) the Central government by a constantγ times its aggrievement 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }* *FB FBC e C e C e C eθ θ θγ θ   − − − − − − −     
If this shading loss is greater than the renegotiation incentive by the Central government, that is,  
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }* * * *
Renegotiation incentive Shading loss 
FB FB FB FBe C e e C e C e C e C e C eγ θ θ θ θ   − − − ≤ − − − − − − −   
((((((((((
((((((((((((((((((((((
the Central government will refrain from proposing the Pareto-improving renegotiation offer in the 
second-term. 28 Thus, the shading mechanism makes point L′ renegotiation-proof. 
 
Proposition 4.2 
The Renegotiation Problem in the No-Commitment environment under the “Fiscal contracting” 
regime can also be solved through the “Shading” Mechanism. That is, the shading mechanism can 
make the second-best contract L′ for the low productivity type renegotiation-proof. 
 
Complementarity with the Tax system before 1994 
In the Fiscal Contracting era (1980-1993), the local tax collection bureau was in charge of both 
Central and Local government revenues. Thus, by responding to the cheating (deviation) behavior by 
the Central government at the beginning of the second term, the local tax collection bureau could 
“shade (punish)” the Central government severely by walking off the job as a tax collecting 
institution of the Central government. Indeed, it could strengthen the enforcement mechanism by 
shading. We summarize this argument as: 
                                                 
28 Because the left-hand side (renegotiation gain) is the second-order gain and the right-hand side 
(shading loss) is the first-order loss, this inequality can indeed hold for γ above a positive threshold. 
30 
 
Proposition5 
Under the “Fiscal contracting” regime, the local tax collection bureau was in charge of both the 
central and local government revenues, and so could shade (punish) the Central government severely 
by sabotaging the job as a tax collecting institution. That is, the Tax System in the “Fiscal 
contracting” era reinforced the enforcement mechanism by shading. 
 
4.6 From Ex-post Discretion (Fiscal Contracting) to Ex-ante Commitment (Tax Sharing) 
 
The solution to the commitment problem (the Ratchet effect) under the fiscal contracting system, 
which relied on a reputation mechanism (short-term gain vs. continuation loss) or on a shading 
mechanism (deviation gain vs. shading loss), was unstable as an institution because of its informal 
and self-enforcing nature. In fact, the reputation mechanism would collapse if the relationship of 
trust between the Central and Local governments wavered. As game theory also shows, if the 
Central and each of the Local governments have different beliefs, there exist many other inefficient 
equilibria (including the above-mentioned pooling equilibrium, where the ratchet effect just appears). 
Similarly, the shading mechanism would not work if the enforcement power of shading is not so 
strong.  
Hence, in 1994, in order to “formally” demolish the opportunity for ex-post renegotiation, where 
the Central government might cheat Local governments, and attempt to ensure “transparency,” the 
fiscal system moved to a complete contractual fiscal system, namely, the current “Tax Sharing 
System,” which commits to the second best solution for two terms (when seen for two consecutive 
terms).  
This could be interpreted as meaning that the fiscal system has moved to the “Tax Sharing System” 
as a commitment solution, which defines more clearly the revenue allocation and clerical allocation 
between the Central and Local governments: the Central Government has thus secured (long-term) 
stable fiscal revenue as a result.29 
 
Complementarity with the Tax system reform in 1994 
The tax system reform was carried out together with the Tax Sharing system（分税制）in 1994, at 
which time the central and local governmental tax collection bureaus were separated（分機構）. That 
is, the national tax collection bureau is in charge of the central government revenues and the local 
bureaus are in charge of the local governmental revenues under the simple, transparent tax structure 
of the 1994 reform. This could be considered a complementary institutional change for achieving the 
complete contractual commitment solution of the Tax Sharing system（分税制）. 
                                                 
29 In fact, the Central government’s fiscal revenue increased discretely in 1994 (due to the introduction of 
the Tax Sharing System), and has maintained stable revenue since then. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Since the “Economic Reform” in 1978, the Chinese economy has achieved significant growth. 
Based on a previous study that reported that the fiscal reforms between the Central and Local 
governments implemented from the 1980s to the 1990s made great contributions to economic 
growth, and taking a hint from the concepts of “Bao (Contract)” and “Bisai (Competition, 
Contest),” we analyzed the structure of the fiscal relations between the Central and Local 
governments by using the mechanism design and contract theory framework. 
We shall summarize our analysis. The concepts of Bao包(Contract) and Bisai比賽 (Contest) 
have both worked effectively since the implementation of Fiscal Contracting (1980～1993) through 
Tax Sharing Systems (1994～). Nonetheless, there exists a difference between the two systems from 
the viewpoint of the “Ratchet Effect”. In Fiscal Contracting (1980～1993), there existed the 
possibility of the Ratchet Effect through ex-post discretion, which had been solved or mitigated by 
an informal, self-enforcing mechanism through Reputation or Shading. In that period (1980～1993), 
Local tax collection bureaus were in charge of both central and local government revenues, which 
strengthened the effect of the self-enforcement mechanism through making the punishment stronger. 
However, because it was still unstable and unclear, the fiscal system had moved to an Ex-ante 
Commitment, Formal and Complete Contractual Tax-sharing system (1994～). At the same time (in 
1994), the Central and Local governmental tax collection bureaus were separated, which was also 
viewed as a complementary institutional change because the Central government committed to its 
clarified tax share (items) and collected its own tax revenues for itself without depending on the 
local tax collection bureaus. The following table summarizes the argument. 
 
       Fiscal Contracting System 
             1980～1993 
          Tax Sharing System 
                1994～ 
“ Bao 包” (Contract) 
        “Bisai 比賽” (Contest) 
“ Bao 包” (Contract) 
        “Bisai 比賽” (Contest) 
           Ex-post Discretion 
         Possibility of Ratchet Effect 
Informal, Self-enforcement Mechanism 
       through Reputation or Shading  
Ex-ante Commitment 
      Formal, Complete Contractual 
         Commitment Solution 
Local tax collection bureau was in charge of 
both central and local government revenues 
Central and local governmental  
    tax collection bureaus were separated 
                                 Table 5 
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Appendix: Optimal Solution under the Central Government’s Altruism 
 
Let us consider the optimization problem by the Central government under the assumption that the 
Central Government is altruistic and has a concern [ ]0,1α ∈  for the high productivity typeθ .30 
Then, the problem is as follows. 
{ }
{ }

( ) ( ) ( )
,
, Information Rent for 
Central Fiscal Revenue from Local Central Fiscal Revenue from Local Government of high productivity high Government of low productivity 
max    1
Y T
Y T
T T C Y C Y
θ θ
λ λ α λ θ θ + − + − − − 
((
  productivity θ
((((((((
Subject to ( ) ( )Y T C Y Y T C Yθ θ− − − ≥ − − −                      
------Incentive constraint for Local governments of the high productive typeθ  
( ) 0Y T C Y θ− − − ≥                        
------Participation constraint for Local governments of the low productive typeθ  
 
According to the same procedure as before, we have the following objective function, namely, the 
expected total surplus minus net expected information rent (incentive cost): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
InformaTotal surplus by local government Total surplus by local government 
      of low productivity type      of high productivity type 
11 C Y C YY C Y Y C Y
θθ
λ θ λ λ θ θαθ − − + − − − −    − −− − 
((((((
(((((
tion rent given to 
high productivity type θ
((((((((
　　　
 
We see that because the Central Government also considers the payoff of the high productivity type 
θ  with the weight [ ]0,1α ∈ , it discounts the information rent (the incentive cost for the Central 
Government) by its portion. 
＊The first order condition for the optimal solution Y for the high productive type θ  is,  
( )1 0C Y θ′− − =       
and is still consistent with the first best solution FBY . 
＊The optimal solutionY for the low productive type θ  reflects the trade-off between the first term 
and the second term below. 
  
{ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Information rent given to 
high productivity type 
Total surplus by local government 
  of low productivity type 
max  1 1
Y
Y C Y C Y C Y
θ θ
αλ θ λ θ θ − − − − − − −   −  
((((((
((((((((
  
 
                                                 
30 For example, note that the “Deng Xiaoping Theory” placed high importance on the payoffs of richer 
regions, that is, regions with higher productivityθ . 
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The first order condition for the optimality is 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1
C Y C Y C Y
λ
θ
α
θ θ
λ
 ′ ′ ′− − = − − −
−
 −  
Hence, the optimal solution 
*Y will increase because the marginal information rent (the right hand 
side) decreases by the altruism parameter [ ]0,1α ∈ . The below figure depicts this logic.31 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Optimal Solution for Low Productivity Type θ   
under Central Government Altruism 
 
The increase in the low productive type’s GDP 
*Y ↑  is generated through the increase in the 
marginal rate of local fiscal revenue for the low productive typeθ . That is, the degree of “Bao 
(Contract)” ( )b θ increases for low productive typeθ . This results in increased Tax for the low 
productive type and an increase in the information rent for the high productive type and, thus, a 
decrease in the Tax for the high productive type: 
( )* * * ,T Y C Y θ= − − ↑ ( ) ( )* *C Y C Yθ θ− − − ↑  
                                                 
31 Note that under perfect altruism 1α =  for high productivity typeθ , the optimal solution for low 
productive type θ  becomes * FBY Y= . Namely, the “distortion at the bottom” is removed and the 
first-best outputs are achieved for both types θ andθ . 
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 and ( ) ( ) ( )* *
this information rent will in
*
First Best total sur creaseplus
FB FB C Y CT C Y YY θ θθ
↑
 − − − −= − − ↓ 
((
((
((((((
(((
 
 
Proposition A2 
Suppose that the Central Government has a concern [ ]0,1α ∈  for the high productivity typeθ . 
Then, the optimal output *Y  for the low productive type θ  increases with the increase of the 
“Bao (Contract)” ( )b θ . Furthermore, the Tax *T  for the low productive type θ  increases, the 
information rent for the high productive type θ increases, and so the Tax *T for the high 
productive type θ  decreases. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Baron, D. and R, Myerson（1982) “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost'', Econometrica 50. 
911-930 
Blanchard, O., and A. Shleifer. (2001) “Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China 
versus Russia” IMF Staﬀ Papers. vol. 48 Special Issues 
Bolton, P and M. Dewatripont (2005) Contract Theory MIT Press 
Demski, J.S. and D. Sappington (1984) "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents", 
Journal of Economic Theory 33(1), June 152-171 
Dewatripont, M (1989) “Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal  
Labor Contracts,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.104. No3, August, 589-619. 
Dewatripont, M. and E.Maskin (1995) “Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized 
Economies,” Review of Economic Studies 62, pp541-555. 
Fehr.E, Hart.O, and C. Zehnder, (2014) “How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape 
Contractual Reference Points?” forthcoming in Journal of the European Economic Association 
Greif, A. (1993) "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi 
Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, 83(3), pp 525-48, June. 
Hart, O. and J. Moore (2008) “Contracts as Reference Points," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 
123(1), pp. 1-48, 02. 
Hart, O and Tirole, J. (1988) “Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics,” Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 55(4), pp509-40, October. 
Jin.H, Y. Qian and B. Weingast (2005), “Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: 
Federalism, Chinese Style”, Journal of Public Economics 89, 9-10, pp. 1719 - 1742. 
35 
 
Laffont, J-J.and J. Tirole (1988) “The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts,” Econometrica, Vol. 56 
No.5, pp. 1153-75, September  
Levin, J. (2002) “Multilateral Contracting and The Employment Relationship,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 117(3), pp.1075-1103, August 
Li, H., and Zhou, L. (2005) Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of 
personnel control in China, Journal of Public Economics, 89(9-10), 1743-1762. 
Maskin, E and J, Riley (1984) “Monopoly with Incomplete Information,” RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol.15. No.2. pp.171-196 
McMillan ,J (1992), Games, Strategies, and Managers, Oxford University Press. 
McMillan, J., Whalley, J., and Zhu, L (1989) “The Impact of China’s Economic Reforms on  
Agricultural Productivity Growth”, Journal of Political Economy 97, 781-807. 
Milgrom, P and J.Roberts. (1992) Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs. 
Mirrlees, J.A. (1971) “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation” Review of 
Economic Studies, 38, 175-208  
Miyake, Y. (2005) The Political Economy of China's Reform and Opening-up Minerva Text Library 
(in Japanese) 
Oi, J. C.  (1992) “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in 
China”, World Politics, Vol. 45 no. 1, pp. 99-126.  
Qian, Y (2006) Invited Talk at Econometric Society Far Eastern Meeting, Beijing, July 10-12 
Qian, Y. and Weingast, B. (1996) “China's Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, 
Chinese Style.” Journal of Policy Reform, 1(2), pp. 149-85. 
Qian, Y. and Weingast, B. (1997) “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall, 11(4), pp. 83-92. 
Riker, W. (1964) Federalism: Origins, Operation, and Significance (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, 
Brown). 
Shleifer, A. (1985) “A Theory of Yardstick Competition,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, No. 
3. pp. 319-327. 
Suzuki, Y., (2007) “Collusion in Organizations and Management of Conflicts through Job Design 
and Authority Delegation”, Journal of Economic Research 12. pp. 203-241  
Suzuki, Y. (ed.) (2010) Cross-Sectoral Comparative Analysis of Governance: A Contract & Game 
Theoretic Approach, Hosei University Press (in Japanese). 
Xu, C. (2011) “The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 49:4, 1076-1151 
